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Abstract 
The European Commission (2001a) has recently presented a directive proposal 
to the European Parliament and Council in order to implement a greenhouse 
gas emission trading scheme. If this proposal survives the policy process, it 
will create the most ambitious trading system ever implemented. However the 
legislative process is an opportunity for various interest groups to amend envi-
ronmental policies which, as a result, generally deviate further from what eco-
nomic literature proposes. A close look at implemented emission trading 
schemes, stressing their discrepancies with economic literature requests, is 
thus useful to increase the chances of forthcoming emission trading schemes to 
go through the political process.  
 
We thus review ten emission trading systems, that are either implemented or at 
an advanced stage of the policy process. We draw attention to major points to 
be aware of when designing an emission trading system: sectoral and spatial 
coverage, permits allocation, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, moni-
toring, enforcement, compliance, and the harmonisation vs. subsidiarity issue. 
The aim is to evaluate how far experiences in emission trading move away 
from theory and why.  
 
We then provide some lessons and recommendations on how to implement a 
greenhouse gas emission trading program in Europe. We identify some pros of 
the Commission proposal (spatial and sectoral coverage, temporal flexibility, 
trading organisation, compliance rules), some potential drawbacks (allocation 
rules, monitoring and enforcement) and items on which further guidance is 
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 3  
 needed (monitoring and allocation rules). Lastly, the European Commission 
should devote prominent attention to the U.S. NOX Ozone Transport Commis-
sion budget program, as the only example of integration between the federal 
and state levels. 
Keywords 
Emission trading, climate change policy, policy-making and implementation 
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 Introduction 
Following the Bonn political agreement and the Marrakech Accords, reached 
respectively in July and November 2001, Japan, the European Union and sev-
eral other European, Latin American, African and Asian countries have rati-
fied the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol will now enter into force if they are 
joined by Russia. Compliance with the first commitment period of the Protocol 
(2008-2012) will require a quick implementation of emission reduction meas-
ures, given the inertia of most emission sources. In the European Union, ac-
cording to the European Climate Change Programme (European Commission, 
2001b), there is a gap in the range of 6.6% and 8% between the effects of ex-
isting policies and measures and the Kyoto target. Given the failure of the 
European Council to agree on a European-wide tax scheme so far, the imple-
mentation of tradable permits is likely to be part of any cost-efficient combi-
nation of policies and measures able to reach the Kyoto target. 
However, the failure of the European Commission tax proposals in the 1990s, 
in spite of their widespread support from environmental economists, recalls 
that even smart environmental policy proposals may perish during the policy 
process. More generally, as stressed by the positive political economy (Keho-
ane et al., 1998) due to the influence of various interest groups, very few envi-
ronmental policies are implemented in their textbook forms. 
A close look at implemented emission trading schemes, stressing their dis-
crepancies with textbook requests, is thus useful to increase the chances of 
forthcoming emission trading schemes to go through the political process 
without being utterly watered down. First, any political entity proposing a 
trading scheme (generally the Ministry in charge of the environment, or the 
DG Environment of the European Commission) will receive various pressures 
from different lobbies on virtually any point of the proposal. Whereas refusing 
all lobby demands risks to lead to the rejection of the proposal, accepting any 
of them is generally neither feasible (some are contradictory) nor welfare im-
proving. Knowledge of detailed features of existing schemes, including the 
design and negotiations of these features, may help these political entities to 
identify on what issues they may stand firm and on what issues they should 
compromise.  
Second, interest groups lobbying consists largely in the dissemination and 
defence of arguments; knowledge of both economic literature and existing 
experience with emission trading is thus useful in the policy process. 
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 Such a systematic multilateral analysis has been lacking so far. Admittedly, a 
number of comparisons of emission trading schemes already exist. Schwarze 
and Zapfel (2000) provide a systematic comparison, but cover only two U.S. 
programs: RECLAIM and Acid Rain. Harrison and Radov (2002) analyse ten 
programmes, but only with respect to allocation. Unctad (1998) and Sonneborn 
(1999) overview progress made at that time in domestic, private and interna-
tional trading schemes but were written before the design of most of the 
schemes we review. At last, Rosenzweig et al. (2002) review twelve recent 
programs but do not systematically compare their features. Furthermore their 
aim is descriptive and prospective – the development of the international 
greenhouse gas (GHG) market – rather than normative. In contrast we aim at 
advising policy-makers. 
We thus review ten domestic and private emission trading systems, that are 
either implemented or at an advanced stage of the policy process. Information 
has been obtained from grey literature, academic sources and interviews. Five 
deal with CO2: Denmark, the U.K., Norway, BP and Shell; two with NOX 
(U.S. OTC and the Netherlands); one with SO2 (U.S. Acid Rain), one with 
particulate matter (Chile) and one with both SO2 and NOX (RECLAIM). We 
thus leave out proposals that are not clearly enough defined yet, as well as 
several earlier or regional experiences in the United States, to prevent our 
survey to be too U.S.-focused. Earlier experiences in credit trading in the 
United States are reviewed in Stavins (2001). At last, we do not deal only with 
GHGs, since some lessons can be drawn from experience with other pollut-
ants. We present together private and public trading schemes to allow a de-
tailed comparison of their features, albeit these two types of systems obviously 
differ by the nature and motivations of the entity in charge of them. 
Unlike most other comparisons mentioned above, we do not use the opposition 
between “cap-and-trade” and “baseline-and-credit” systems because a litera-
ture review reveals that such wordings are equivocal. Indeed, for UNCTAD 
(1998: 22), the specificity of a “baseline-and-credit” system is to be project-
based; on the contrary, in the way Boom and Nentjes (2002) define credit trad-
ing, "there is no need for abatement projects to create credits" but credits are 
expressed in unit of pollutant per unit of output; for Tietenberg (1999b: 8), a 
“credit” system “is typically denominated in terms of a pollutant flow such as 
tons/year”; for Rosenzweig et al. (2002: 2), the key distinction is that in a 
“baseline-and-credit” system, the seller does not necessarily have an emission 
cap. We thus avoid these terms but deal with these issues in sections 1.2 (opt-
in) and 2 (output-based allocation). 
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 Although the idea of tradable permits is quite simple, their implementation 
involves several steps that may make one system essentially different from 
another. We thus point out major items to be aware of when designing an 
emission trading system. Section 1 deals with sectoral and spatial coverage. 
Sections 2 and 3 are about, respectively, permit allocation and temporal flexi-
bility. Sections 4 presents trading organisation aspects, and section 5 discusses 
monitoring and enforcement. Lastly, section 6 draws some lessons on the har-
monization vs. subsidiarity issue from the U.S. OTC NOX programme, the 
only example of integration between the federal and state levels. 
For each item, we provide some recommendations on the implementation of a 
tradable permits system for GHGs in Europe. 
Two tables at the end of the paper gather the core information on the ten sys-
tems studied, as well as on the EU trading directive proposal. 
 
I. Sectoral and spatial coverage 
I.1.  Theoretical requirements 
Standard theory suggests that providing, first, damages do not depend on lo-
calisation of emissions and, second, administrative and monitoring costs are 
not disproportionate, as many emitters as possible should be covered by the 
permit scheme, for two reasons. 
First, a large number of participants is required to benefit from significant 
abatement cost differences among firms. 
Second, it lowers the risk of market power on the permit market. Market 
power involves the ability of participants to manipulate prices strategically 
either as a monopolistic seller or a monopsonistic buyer (Hahn, 1984). This 
behaviour has two detrimental effects. First, it reduces the volume of transac-
tions, lessening the cost-effectiveness of the system. Second, as shown by 
Misiolek and Elder (1989), the combination of market power on the permit 
market and on the good market may allow some firms to dry up the permit 
market in order to prevent the entry of new firms or to push existing ones out 
of the market. For this to happen, participants in the permit scheme have to 
operate on the same good market. 
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 For CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning, two levels of control are avail-
able: upstream (at the level of the producers and importers of fossil fuels, who 
would then raise their prices) and downstream (at the level of the fossil fuel 
consumer, i.e., the CO2 emitter). In a world with no distortion (apart from the 
environmental externality), the former approach should be preferred, since the 
latter does not allow to control diffuse sources (households and small firms) 
without raising transaction costs to a very high level. However, one can argue 
that diffuse sources pay typically higher pre-existing taxes on fossil fuels than 
large emitters, hence a downstream system, targeting the latter, may be prefer-
able1. Furthermore if energy markets are imperfect, permit cost may be passed 
on unevenly to various types of consumers, lessening the superiority of an 
upstream scheme. 
For other pollutants than GHGs, location does matter and the threat of "hot 
spots", i.e., local concentration of pollution, may be a rationale for limiting 
spatial coverage. Emission trading may increase the threat of hot spots in two 
main ways. First, trades may create unacceptably high local concentrations 
near sources that have acquired permits as an alternative to further control. 
Second, permits may allow the long range transport of emissions to increase, 
thereby increasing deposition problems (Tietenberg, 1999b).  
Two tools have been proposed to adapt emission trading to these problems. 
First, a substitute to the limitation of the spatial coverage is to define "ex-
change rates" between geographical zones. Second, air quality goals or deposi-
tion targets at certain locations can be approached by the creation of transfer-
able ambient permits or deposition permits (Ermoliev et al., 2000). However 
administrative and transaction costs may well be very high, which provides a 
rationale for a reduction in spatial coverage. 
A reduction in sectoral coverage may also be sound in some cases, in particu-
lar when pre-existing energy taxes differ from one sector to another, thus pre-
venting permit trading from equalising social marginal abatement costs among 
sectors (Babiker et al., 2001). 
 
I.2 How far experiences in emission trading move away from 
theory and why  
                                                          
1 Zhang (1998) also argues that only a downstream system provides an incentive for energy end-
users to develop carbon disposal technologies; however, even leaving aside the shortcomings of 
these technologies, in an upstream system, credits could be created for disposal just as they 
should be given for petroleum used as a feedstock. 
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 Spatial coverage  
To our knowledge, markets for tradeable ambient permits do not exist, nor do 
systems of exchange rates between geographical zones. Location is dealt with 
by reducing spatial coverage (RECLAIM), by imposing restrictions on trading 
(NOX OTC; see Tietenberg, 1998), or by "regulatory tiering" (SO2 in the U.S.; 
see Tietenberg, 2001), which combines a trading with a non-trading instru-
ment, the latter protecting against harmful spatial clustering of emissions. 
Spatial coverage is also reduced because upwind states or regions are reluctant 
to cut their emissions if damages they cause occur mainly in downwind states 
or regions (NOX OTC; cf. Farrell, 2001).  
Such concerns are important concerning ozone or acid rains, but much less 
when addressing climate change where the GHG accumulation in the atmos-
phere determines the global warming potential. Note, however, that reducing 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuels usually leads to a reduction in local pollut-
ants; hence localisation of emissions does matter, although indirectly. 
The comparison of large- (Acid Rain), medium- (OTC budget) and small-scale 
(RECLAIM) existing schemes indicates that the larger the coverage, the 
smaller the price volatility (Farrell, 2002; Ellerman, 2001).  
Sectoral coverage  
In most cases, the regulators have chosen not to include as many emitters as 
possible, at least in a first phase, possibly to avoid facing too many opposi-
tions at a time. Sectoral coverage has sometimes been reduced to one sector at 
the beginning of the system in order to reach the simplest system possible 
(Denmark).  
For this reason, with the exception of the Norwegian project, a downstream 
approach has been preferred over an upstream one (U.K., Denmark, BP, 
Shell). 
Acid Rain and OTC budget have been implemented in two phases whereas the 
others have not. In the Acid Rain program, large sources with relatively high 
SO2 emissions were regulated first in Phase I which lasted from 1995 to 2000. 
Phase II started in 2000 and includes most other significant sources. Because 
the electric utility industry is highly interconnected, sources in Phase I can 
easily shift their load (and emissions) to unaffected sources which would not 
be covered until Phase II. This load shifting capability has made implementing 
a phased approach difficult (Environmental Law Institute, 1997). 
 9  
 Experiences show that although the pollutants covered among the emission 
trading schemes are different, electricity generating units are the most often 
affected sources (Acid Rain, OTC budget, Denmark). Notable exceptions are 
the U.K. scheme – Although electricity generators might opt-in on a project-
by-project basis – and the RECLAIM one for SO2 – NOX emissions from elec-
tricity generation are covered. This is due to social reasons in the U.K.: the 
government did not want the electricity bill of low-budget households to go 
up, fuel poverty being a hot issue in this country.  
Phase-in 
To alleviate the difficulty in implementing a large system at once, a phased 
approach can expand coverage so as to get the most comprehensive system as 
possible but a phased coverage of sources within an industry may create a 
perverse incentive to shift production to non regulated sources (e.g. smaller 
units). This problem could be addressed by an output based allocation, but 
with possible other perverse side effects (cf. 2.1 below and Fischer, 2001). 
Note that a phased coverage of industries does not raise such concern.  
Opt-in 
Some programs include provisions for firms to voluntarily participate (opt-in) 
either as a permanent part of the program, receiving an annual allocation of 
allowances, or on a project-by-project basis. The Acid Rain program allows 
two provisions for permanent opt-in. The first type of opt-in allowed utility 
sources that would normally not be covered until Phase II (starting in 2000) to 
participate in Phase I (1995-2000). In addition, the program provides for non-
utility industries with SO2 emissions to opt into the regulatory system. This 
opt-in program allows these important sources of emissions to participate in 
the program, which otherwise would not cover them. The EPA (Environmental 
Protection Agency) has promulgated opt-in rules for industrial combustion 
sources, which emit 14% of all SO2.  
Any opt-in source has to have a definable baseline and accurate emissions 
monitoring to guarantee that any further reductions they make contribute to the 
environmental goals. The opt-in source must demonstrate its baseline emis-
sions and an adequate monitoring plan (Environmental Law Institute, 1997). 
Indeed, sources have an interest in opting in if they can cheaply reduce emis-
sions and derive economics benefits from selling their excess allowances. This 
raises the risk that firm opt in only if they can benefit from an over-estimated 
baseline – "hot air" in the climate negotiations lingo. There is thus an obvious 
trade-off between administrative and monitoring costs, on the one hand, and 
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 environmental integrity on the other hand. In the Acid Rain case, Montero 
(2000) explains that a large number of non-affected units opted in because 
their unrestricted emissions were below their permit allocation – they had 
received excess permits. The author develops a theoretical model of optimal 
permit allocation to opt-in firms, but how to best implement such a model in 
practice remains a topic for future research. 
 
I.3 Lessons for the European GHG trading scheme 
The European Commission proposal provides a wide spatial and sectoral cov-
erage, even if other gases than CO2 and CO2 from chemical industry processes 
are not covered. These emissions are likely to be phased in later. The former 
exemption is motivated by monitoring difficulties, which should not be under-
estimated, although the Norwegian proposal includes some of them. The latter 
is motivated by the number of sources and the resulting administrative costs, 
but a more likely explanation is the will to soften opposition from the German 
chemical industry, which already rejects the directive because of the resulting 
increase in energy costs. A significantly wider coverage could have been pro-
vided only by an upstream system, which has been excluded by the Commis-
sion at the beginning of the process. The reason was again political: an up-
stream scheme would have too much looked like the carbon tax rejected in the 
nineties. 
The coverage could have been narrowed a lot by the opt-out provision that was 
present in previous drafts of the proposal. It allowed a state to exclude some 
sectors from the system, provided that they were regulated by another instru-
ment, such as a voluntary agreement. Such a provision, which is still pushed 
for by some industries and Member States, may harm a lot the efficiency of 
the system. 
Perhaps for the sake of symmetry, the opt-in provision has also been dropped 
in the final proposal. The possibility to develop an opt-in scheme that induces 
a significant number of firms to take commitments without weakening the 
environmental ambition and boosting administrative costs is unlikely, in the 
light of the Acid rain experience. However, the Commission (2001b) intends 
to introduce another directive allowing opt-in on a project-by-project basis, 
which would create the same problems. 
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 II. Permits allocation  
II.1. Theoretical requirements  
From an economic point of view, three methods of allocating permits have to 
be distinguished: auction, criteria exogenous for firms receiving the permits, 
and output-based allocation. 
• when allowances are auctioned, the permits are allocated to the 
highest bidders. Various allocation methods exist (see Klemperer, 
1999, for a general survey or Cramton and Kerr, 2002, for auc-
tioning applied to tradable permits).  
• the most common exogenous criteria are grandfathering, i.e., a share of his-
torical emissions, and benchmarking, i.e., a proportion of historical produc-
tion. With purely exogenous criteria, new entrants have to buy their permits 
from existing sources and a firm continues to receive permits even if its plants 
shut down. 
• with an "output-based" or "performance standard" allocation, firms receive 
an amount of permits proportional to their current production (x permits per 
kWh for power plants, y permits per ton of aluminium…). Of course, since no 
sole indicator of production exists, the total amount of permits has first to be 
divided between sectors, except when a single sector is covered. Such an allo-
cation method is equivalent to "specific" or "relative" permits (or credits), i.e., 
expressed in relative terms (e.g., one ton of CO2 per kWh). 
General equilibrium modelling has shown that the most cost-efficient way to 
allocate permits is to auction them and to use the revenue to cut pre-existing 
distortionary taxes (e.g. Goulder et al., 1999; Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001). 
Indeed grandfathered and auctioned permits, like any instrument that allows 
firms to reach part of their target by reducing their production, raise product 
prices above the marginal cost of production, generating a scarcity rent. With 
grandfathering, this rent is captured by regulated firms, which is socially inef-
ficient when public funds are raised through distortionary taxes. Auctioning 
socialises this scarcity rent and allows to use it to cut pre-existing taxes or to 
produce public goods. According to the "strong double-dividend" hypothesis 
(Goulder, 1995), such policy would even increase welfare and employment. 
Although this hypothesis is controversial, the superiority of auctioning over 
grandfathering (the "weak double dividend") is not. 
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 Furthermore, grandfathering reduces the incentive for regulated firms to de-
velop environmental innovations, as compared to auctioning (Milliman and 
Prince, 1989). This is because environmental innovations reduce the value of 
the permits, thus the wealth of permits-holders. 
Third, grandfathering may create a bias against new firms entering product 
market, since existing firms get their permits free while new firms must buy 
them (Howe, 1994). Such a problem may arise if the capital market is imper-
fect and/or if existing firms benefit from market power on the permits markets. 
In both cases, these firms may be able to use their permits to drive their poten-
tial competitors out of the market. 
At last, before the beginning of the system, grandfathering can increase pollu-
tion if sources are aware that larger current emissions will result in larger fu-
ture permit allocations. This problem can be circumvented by basing the initial 
allocation, not on actual emissions, but on past emissions, or on the command-
and-control authorised emissions, as it has been done in the earlier stages of 
permit systems in the United States (Tietenberg, 1999a).  
Output-based allocation does not suffer from the first shortcoming: it does not 
create scarcity rents since it provides no incentive to raise the price-cost mar-
gin. Nor does it suffer from the third weakness: new entrants receive the same 
number of permits as existing firms. However, the allocation of permits acts as 
a subsidy to production. Therefore, it prevents to fully mobilise inter-sectoral 
substitutions in the overall reduction in emissions. For instance, an output-
based CO2 permits scheme would provide an incentive to reduce CO2 emis-
sions per ton of concrete produced, but hardly to substitute wood for concrete 
in buildings. Furthermore, the definition of "output" raises complex problems 
(Fischer, 2001). 
The main economic advantage of an output-based allocation over the two oth-
ers is that it reduces drastically the incentive to relocate polluting activities in 
"pollution havens". Indeed, if a polluting firm closes, it receives no permits 
anymore. On the contrary, with pure grandfathering, a firm can close its plants 
in the regulated country, build a new plant abroad and still benefit from grand-
fathered permits.  
Edwards and Hutton (2001) general equilibrium simulations indicate that such 
an output-based CO2 permits scheme could allow much of the potential "dou-
ble dividend" to be realised, though an auction system would still be prefer-
able. On the other hand, Burtraw et al. (2001) partial equilibrium simulations 
of the electricity generation sector in the U.S. suggest that output-based allo-
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 cation of CO2 permits would imply roughly the same cost than grandfathering, 
and about twice that of auctioning. 
II.2. How far experiences in emission trading move away 
from theory and why  
Most experiences in emission trading have used grandfathering or benchmark-
ing (Acid rain, RECLAIM, Chile, U.K., BP, Shell), sometimes with special 
provisions for new entrants: auctioning (Acid rain) or free distribution accord-
ing to criteria still to be defined (Denmark). Exceptions are the OTC budget 
that lets firms decide between grandfathering and an output-based allocation, 
the Dutch NOX (output-based allocation) and the proposal of the Norwegian 
quota commission, a majority of whom favours selling the allowances. Imple-
mentation of the latter system is not decided yet. 
The choice of grandfathering in most systems is a direct consequence of the 
political influence of regulated firms in the policy process (Kehoane et al., 
1998). Indeed, a lesson from positive political economy is that firms which 
risk an important loss are more likely to incur the costs of lobbying than 
households or firms which could benefit from a reduction in pre-existing taxes 
– even if they outnumber the former2.  
A politically interesting feature of the output-based allocation is that it can be 
based on existing performance standard, like in the Dutch system, which likely 
increases its acceptability among firms and the administration. Furthermore, 
an output-based allocation is more acceptable to regulated firms than auction-
ing since it is revenue-neutral.  
 
II.3. Lessons for the European GHG trading scheme  
The proposal let each Member State design a national allocation plan which 
has to respect a number of criteria, related in particular to the EU burden shar-
ing agreement and competition rules, and which will be reviewed by the 
Commission. In addition permits have to be distributed free of charge in the 
first period (2005-2007), while the allocation method for next periods is to be 
decided later on. According to the directive proposal, the plan shall "contain 
                                                          
2 According to an anonymous referee, this idea can be traced back to Machiavelli. 
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 information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin partici-
pation", and the explanatory memorandum adds that Member States should 
"ensure that new entrants have adequate access to allowances" without further 
precision. However, in its statement on the Danish emission trading system, 
the European Commission obliged Denmark to provide new entrants with 
permits in the same conditions than existing firms, which constitutes a step 
towards an output-based allocation. Furthermore a "new entrant" is not de-
fined: does it apply only to a company not previously producing in the Mem-
ber State? To a new site? A new installation? A capacity extension of an exist-
ing installation? Hence the degree of freedom let to Member States for choos-
ing among possible free-of-charge allocation criteria in the first period re-
mains unclear.  
The allocation issue is arguably the aspect of the proposal which is most open 
to criticism. Let’s in turn examine three possible rationales for harmonising 
allocation: two conceptions of competitive distortions and carbon leakage. Van 
der Laan and Nentjes (2001) as well as Woerdman (2001) note that there are 
two interpretations of the competitive distortion concept: first, as an ineffi-
ciency in allocation of resources and, second, as an inequity of firm’s starting 
conditions. From the efficiency perspective, there is no competitive distortion 
and thus no need for harmonisation if some countries distribute permits free of 
charge according to an exogenous criterion, and others auction them. Indeed, 
even grandfathered permits have an opportunity cost; see also Zhang (1999a). 
On the contrary, there is a rationale for preventing (or harmonising) output-
based allocation since it constitutes an output subsidy, albeit combined with a 
tax on pollution. The directive proposal is thus inconsistent with the efficiency 
interpretation of the competitive distortion argument. 
In the equity interpretation of competitive distortions, the focus is on equity 
among firm-owners in different countries, which incidentally seems an odd 
policy goal since the ownership of firms to be regulated by the directive is 
more and more trans-national. Anyhow, a generalisation of free allocation 
does not makes much sense, because it must be stressed that not all the permits 
have to be grandfathered to compensate existing firms: several studies show 
that the grandfathering of all permits is likely to overcompensate the regulated 
industry. Bovenberg and Goulder (2000) as well as the U.S. Congressional 
budget office (2000) have demonstrated that the complete grandfathering of 
CO2 upstream permits in the U.S. would let fossil fuel firms better off, and not 
worse off. Indeed, the gain from the scarcity rent would be much greater than 
the profit loss due to the decline in production. According to Burtraw et al. 
(2001), the same is true for downstream CO2 permits in the U.S. electricity 
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 generation sector. At last, simulations by Hourcade et al. (2002) exhibit the 
same conclusions for the European iron and steel sector. 
If, now, one is afraid of "carbon leakage" towards unregulated areas, pure 
grandfathering or benchmarking, if capital is perfectly mobile, does not per-
form better than auctioning3.  
We thus have to rely on political economy reasons to explain allocation 
choices in the directive proposal. For energy-intensive lobbies, two sequential 
decisions may impact their profit: the adoption of the directive and the accep-
tance the approval of national allocation plans. For the Commission, prohibit-
ing auctioning in the directive reduces the risks of seeing these lobbies oppos-
ing the directive just to prevent National allocation plans from relying heavily 
on auctioning.  
For the Commission, this is probably a good way to reduce the risk of rejec-
tion of the proposal. A more ambitious and risky strategy would be to try to 
mobilise potential winners from auctioning combined to existing tax cuts, 
following the "double-dividend" strategy that allowed ecological tax reforms 
in Scandinavian countries. However, this strategy failed in the European 
Community in the early nineties and it is not more likely to succeed now. An-
other ambitious and risky strategy, following Kopp et al. (1999), would be to 
distribute revenues from auctioning to all citizens as a basic income in order to 
increase public support for emission mitigation, but distributing revenues to 
citizens is not part of European institutions competences. 
All in all, the choices of the European Commission as regards allocation re-
flect political economy constraints much more than an application of insights 
from economic theory. 
                                                          
3 Auctioning permits in the sheltered sectors and allocating them according to production in 
exposed sectors, as the Dutch Vogtländer commission on CO2 trade recommends, could have 
made sense. However the European Union as a whole is much less open than the Netherlands, 
and energy-intensive sectors are not among the most exposed to international competition, as 
shown by Fouquin et al. (2001). Simulations by Hourcade et al. (2002) conclude that the imple-
mentation of the proposed directive would not create a significant carbon leakage problem. 
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 III. Temporal flexibility  
III.1 Theoretical requirements  
Standard theory suggests that as long as there is no risk of "temporal hot 
spots", a fully cost-effective tradable permit system must have full temporal 
flexibility, implying that allowances can be both borrowed and banked (Rubin, 
1996). In general banking encourages firms to make early investments by al-
lowing them to either use or sell allowances not needed for compliance during 
the current year. Banking of allowances provides sources with significant ad-
ditional flexibility in compliance investment and decision-making. 
The key concern with banking involves the potential for creating "temporal hot 
spots". Complete freedom on temporal offers the possibility for emissions to 
be concentrated in time. Since clustered emissions can cause more danger than 
dispersed emissions, regulators have chosen to put restrictions on the temporal 
use of permits despite the cost-effectiveness penalty that extracts (Tietenberg, 
1999b). 
Another concern lies in the fact that the accumulation of a large bank of al-
lowances could make rapid implementation of future emissions reductions 
more difficult. 
Borrowing gives flexibility by allowing firms to delay investments until such 
time as they may be optimal from the firm's perspective. However, it raises 
two concerns. First, borrowing, especially if unlimited, triggers the possibility 
to delay emission reduction indefinitely. Second, pending the adoption of fu-
ture commitments, a source may have an incentive to rely heavily on borrow-
ing to artificially raise its future compliance cost curve and obtain softer future 
targets. 
 
III.2 How far experiences move away from theory and why 
III.2.1 Allowance reference period  
The allowance reference period can be daily, seasonal or annual. It is related 
to the perceived damage pattern: when marginal environmental damage is 
thought to be relatively constant over one or several years, as for global warm-
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 ing or acidification by SO2, the reference period is at least annual. For ozone 
or particulates, because pollution peaks mater, the reference period is daily 
(Chile) or seasonal (five months in OTC budget).  
III.2.2 Banking  
Most of the emission trading programs allow banking, the Netherlands, RE-
CLAIM and Chile being exceptions. Sometimes it is restricted because of 
health considerations (OTC budget). There has been heavy use of banking in 
the U.S. Acid Rain Program, which has led to early reductions and substan-
tially lowered overall costs of compliance. Banking is especially significant 
for industries in which major capital expenditures must be made, as it allows 
individual sources flexibility in the timing of such major investments.  
The argument against banking by which banked allowances could be used over 
a short term period to increase emissions with a detrimental effect on envi-
ronment, may be significant for SO2 or NOX but is not for GHGs. 
Another concern by which the accumulation of a large bank of allowances 
could threaten futures GHG reductions can be addressed by giving allowances 
a long but limited life or by limiting the overall possible amount of banked 
allowances. It would prevent the possibility that a large allowance bank may 
build up and affect the government's ability to increase or decrease allowance 
allocating according to future internationally negotiated limits. The Environ-
mental Law Institute (1997) report proposes a long life such as 20 years to 
allow sources to capture all the benefits of banking, while allowing the gov-
ernment increased flexibility; in addition, the size of any future reduction 
could also be adjusted to reflect the size of the allowance bank. 
III.2.3 Borrowing 
Borrowing is not explicitly allowed in any emission trading experiences be-
cause of ensuing difficulties in resolving environmental problems4. However, 
restoration of "excess tons" in subsequent periods, which is de facto borrow-
ing, is a part of the compliance system in the OTC NOX (cf. 5.2 below). 
                                                          
4 According to UNCTAD (1998: 18) New Zealand fisheries license trading (not reviewed here) 
allows borrowing up to 10 % of the annual quota, but this provision “may be repealed, as bor-
rowing has proven administratively complex and has caused enforcement problems”. 
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 III.3 Lessons for the European GHG trading scheme 
Because the European directive proposal aims at helping the E.U. to comply 
with the Kyoto Protocol, it is useful to recall the temporal flexibility provi-
sions of the Protocol and subsequent texts. The Protocol allows banking (ex-
cept, since the Marrakech Accords, for sinks credits), which may encourage 
early reductions beyond the Kyoto target. For the reasons mentioned above, 
borrowing, as a flexibility mechanism, has not been allowed by the Protocol. 
However, according to the Bonn political agreement, the main provision for 
non-compliance is the deduction of 1.3 times the excess emissions from a 
Party's first commitment period assigned amount, to be applied to the assigned 
amount of the second commitment period. This is economically borrowing5, 
but is politically very different since a Party in such a situation will be de-
clared in non-compliance and undergo other consequences: submission of a 
compliance action plan, suspension of eligibility to transfer allowances via 
emission trading or joint implementation. 
The directive proposal allows for the banking of allowances but not for the 
borrowing. Both provisions seem sound, the former because there is no risk of 
"temporal hot spot" in the context of climate change, the latter for all the rea-
sons mentioned above. The resulting loss of cost-effectiveness in eliminating 
borrowing is a reasonable price to pay for easing enforcement and compliance. 
IV. Trading organisation  
IV.1Theoretical requirements 
If all participants emissions are capped, and without monitoring or enforce-
ment problem (cf. section 5 below) there is no reason to require a governmen-
tal approval for trades.  
On the contrary, requiring trades to be centralised by a clearing-house or bro-
ker makes sense to prevent market power, improve price information and mar-
ket efficiency; such an institution would play the role of Walras “secrétaire de 
marché”. However if the market is big and atomistic enough a single price is 
likely to emerge.  
                                                          
5 The interest rate is 30% over the five-years period hence 5% per year. 
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 At last, compulsory registration of trades is a useful management tool because 
it creates an open, public process for allowance recordation which helps en-
sure compliance with the law. Coupled with the penalty provisions a registry 
works well for compliance purposes (Environmental Law Institute, 1997). 
IV.2 How far experiences move away from theory and why 
All programs allow direct bilateral trade, except BP and Shell's in which trans-
actions have to be made through a central broker, and Chile in which an ad-
ministrative approval is required.  
All implemented emission trading systems include the registration of transfers 
(Acid Rain, OTC budget, RECLAIM). A registry set up by the organism who 
has the institutional governance records the companies' allowances accounts 
(except in the Danish case). 
International experiences speak for simplicity: bilateral trade without prior 
government approval favours trading and lowers transaction costs6 but manda-
tory registration is needed to assess country compliance with the Kyoto com-
mitment. 
IV.3 Lessons for the European GHG trading scheme 
The EU directive proposal sticks to usual practices by allowing bilateral trans-
actions without government approval but with mandatory registration, which is 
neither surprising nor unsound. 
V.  Monitoring and enforcement 
V.1. Theoretical requirements 
The enforcement of permit system depends on the technical ability to detect 
violations and the legal ability to deal with them once detected, thus to deter 
them.  
                                                          
6 Most earlier U.S. credit trading programs (not reviewed here) required government approval 
and, according to UNCTAD (1998: 19), have “not achieved significant economic or environ-
mental benefits” because of induced transaction costs. 
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 Direct continuous monitoring of emissions has been an important factor is the 
success of the Acid Rain program but others techniques are available for esti-
mating the emissions flow, such as, for CO2, calculation using activity data, 
emission factors and oxidation factors. A second requirement is the legal au-
thority to deal with non compliance including effective sanctions. A guideline 
can be set up: the smaller the probability of control is, the higher the non com-
pliance penalty should be. 
The last point is the liability rule, i.e., does a permits remain valid when its 
issuer turns out to be in non-compliance? The answer is yes in a "seller liabil-
ity" regime and no in a "buyer liability" one, but numerous other rules exist7. 
Pure seller liability should be avoided if the compliance regime is weak, since 
it can spur over-selling (Zhang, 1999b). If the compliance regime is strong, 
pure seller liability minimises transaction costs. 
V.2 How far experiences move away from theory and why 
V.1.1. Monitoring 
One of the reasons why the Acid Rain program has been successful is the high 
integrity of the allowance currency, due to the requirement that utilities install 
continuous emissions monitoring devices to accurately measure actual emis-
sions (Environmental Law Institute, 1997). 
Several programs require continuous emissions monitoring by sources (Acid 
Rain, OTC budget, RECLAIM). 
Reporting is a key compliance mechanism and covers both emissions monitor-
ing results and emission trading activity. On a national level, many countries 
require monthly reporting of emission data. Continuous emissions monitoring 
technology allows reporting as often as every 15 minutes. U.S. domestic trad-
ing systems require reporting of emission trading activity to a government 
registry which is open to the public and may be available on the world wide 
web (Unctad, 1998). 
                                                          
7 Haites and Missfeldt (2000) analyse these rules in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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 V.1.2. Penalties 
Acid Rain, RECLAIM, Denmark, Chile, U.K. set penalties for non-
compliance, but at very different levels: respectively $2000/ton SO2, $500 per 
day and $6 per ton CO2 for the first three. The OTC budget let states defines 
penalties; most of them combine a financial fine with a deduction of allow-
ances from the subsequent year. Compliance appears to be positively corre-
lated both to the level and to the automatic nature of penalties (Stranlund et 
al., 2002). In BP, there is no penalty whereas in Shell there is a fine equal to 
three times the average fourth quarter price for each permit short fall. 
V.1.3. Liability 
All the systems we have studied feature seller liability. 
V.3 Lessons for the European GHG trading scheme 
High quality monitoring is essential to assure effectiveness of both compliance 
and trading systems. The Commission decision to start with the sole CO2 re-
flects the importance given to monitoring. However it allows for calculation 
using activity data, emission factor and oxidation factor, which is not without 
problems. The accuracy of current national inventories based on this method 
falls far short of what is needed for a trading scheme, but further guidance will 
be provided at the EU level by an ongoing commission. 
The main difficulty is likely to stem from the international character of EU 
policy. Implementation of EU directives, unlike that of national policies, is a 
two-stage process (Glachant, 2001). The directive has first to be transposed in 
the Member States’ legislation and then put into practice by national admini-
strations. This threatens effective implementation since in addition to the clas-
sical risk of non-compliance by the polluters, the states may fail to transpose 
the directive or to apply correctly its provisions. 
Compliance penalties seem to be set at a sufficiently high level: 50 €/t CO2 in 
the first period, 100 afterwards, or twice the average market price, whichever 
is the higher. In addition restoration of excess tons is required in the following 
year. Seller liability is thus a judicious choice if the directive is properly en-
forced by Member States. Otherwise, a joint liability to the buyer and the 
seller could be sensible. 
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 VI.  Harmonisation versus subsidiarity 
In the Green paper on emission trading issued by the European Commission 
(2000) to prepare the directive, most open questions were related to the "har-
monisation vs. subsidiarity" issue: what should be set at the European level 
and what should be left for Member States to decide? Three features were of 
particular concern: sectoral coverage, compliance regime and allowance allo-
cation. 
VI.1. Theoretical requirements 
A basic theoretical requirement is to try to equalise costs and benefits in each 
country. Since the benefit from cutting emissions is the same in whatever 
country the reduction takes place, and because tradable permits allow to equal-
ise marginal abatement costs despite national circumstances8, theory calls for a 
high degree of harmonisation of sectoral coverage and compliance regime. The 
picture is more complex on allowance allocation: it has a large impact on 
revenue distribution, which is a Member State competence, but also possibly 
efficiency consequences (cf. 2.1 above).  
VI.2. The experience of the U.S. NOX OTC budget pro-
gram 
The OTC program in the United States gives the only example of integration 
between federal and state levels. The program is under U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) guidance. Eleven north-eastern states, the district of 
Columbia and Northern Virginia implemented a trading system in 1999 to 
reduce compliance costs associated with the OTC (Ozone Transport Commis-
sion) regulations of the 1990 Amendments of the Clean Air Act (Farrell et al., 
1999).  
                                                          
8 This is true only as long as pre-existing differences in the regulatory and fiscal frameworks 
does not create false gains from trade, as stressed by Babiker et al. (2001). This calls for im-
planting the directive proposal on harmonising minimum excise duties across Member States, 
but it is unlikely that increasing the degree of freedom of Member States in the trading system 
would help to solve the problem. 
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 EPA distributes NOX allowances to each state based on state wide emissions 
inventories and states are free to determine the allocation procedure to 
sources. Each state has to identify its budget sources.  
How did the states identify their budget sources? In 1994, the states under the 
OTC program (except Virginia) have signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU). They agreed they would implement reasonably available control tech-
nologies (RACT) on major stationary sources of NOX in phase I (before the 
implementation of emission trading which only begin in phase II in 1999) and 
agreed to a phased approach for additional controls, beyond RACT for power 
plants and other large fuel combustion sources (phase II and III). The MOU 
establishes an emission trading system to reduce the costs of compliance with 
the control requirements under Phase II (which began on May 1, 1999) and 
Phase III (beginning on May 1, 2003). 
Although states have to identify their budget sources, the MOU provides guid-
ance: the budget sources include a core group of electric generating units with 
a rated electrical output of 15 MW or greater, and fossil fuel-fired boilers or 
indirect heat exchangers with a maximum rated heat input capacity of 250 
mmBtu/hour or more. Aside from these requisite budget sources, states also 
had the option of including other source categories (e.g. cement plants) in the 
program. Additional stationary sources of NOX emissions designated as eligi-
ble by the state may choose to opt-in on an individual basis. In fact, the OTC 
seasonal budget was developed through a uniform process across all states. 
How did the states allocate allowances ? Under the MOU a 'model' trading rule 
has been developed for states in the OTC to use as a template in the develop-
ment of their own regulations. While the model rule was developed as guid-
ance for state regulatory development, the OTC is state-operated and decen-
tralised by design. States therefore had the option of 'tailoring' individual pro-
gram elements such as allocation methodology to fit state-defined criteria. 
The number of allowances distributed in each state is calculated as a percent-
age of total (actual or estimated) 1990 emissions or the equivalent as a "per-
formance standard" (which is basically an output-based allocation). A source 
may choose which standard applies to it, and the state environmental agency 
then allocates allowances according to this standard. 
• The states are responsible for ensuring that sources are in compliance with 
all requirements of the program (monitoring and reporting actual emissions 
and compliance demonstration process). 
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 • EPA is responsible for reviewing and approving each state's regulation into a 
State Implementation Plan. 
• EPA is responsible for developing and operating an adequate trading regis-
tration. 
VI.3. Lessons for the European GHG trading scheme 
OTC budget has common rules concerning affected sectors, compliance provi-
sions and (partly) allocation criteria. A core of participants is defined at the 
federal level. The first three years of the trading program (1999-2001) seem to 
draw a successful picture: emissions have decreased faster than required, non-
compliance has been marginal (0.03% of emissions at most) and the market 
participation has been broad (Farrell, 2002; U.S. EPA, 2002). Attainment of 
the environmental objective is far from certain, but this due to the spatial and 
temporal nature of the pollutant: ozone is transported from uncovered "up-
wind" states to covered "downwind" states, and the capacity of the program to 
properly deal with "temporal hot spots" (ozone pollution peaks) is an open 
question. In any case these issues do not apply to GHGs. 
Some features of the EU directive proposal are more harmonised: sanctions are 
common and so are participants since there is no opt-in possibility at the mo-
ment. As in the OTC system, in the first period, states have a large degree of 
freedom to set their allocation rule provided this allocation is for free.  
However a key difference is that the OTC budget program sets an overall cap 
for each state whereas in the EU proposal, the overall cap for each Member 
State will be defined by the national allocation plan submitted by this State 
and reviewed by the European Commission. The EU-wide cap will then result 
from the addition of these national caps. The Commission can reject proposed 
plans, but this would probably lead to difficult political disputes. As a conse-
quence, in the European proposal, distortion of competition problems could 
arise not only because the allocation criteria are not precise enough (cf. sec-
tion 2.3 above), but also because the total amount of allowances to be distrib-
uted in each Member State will be decided during the review of national allo-
cation plans, probably without much transparency. 
The OTC budget trading program is badly known in Europe, probably because 
of its novelty and of its complex architecture. However, precisely because of 
this complex competence sharing between the federal and the state level, a 
problem which also arises for European directives, Europeans should devote 
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 prominent attention to this experience as well as to other forthcoming NOX 
trading programs ("SIP Call" and "Federal NOX budget"; cf. Farrell and Mor-
gan, 2001). 
 
Conclusion 
A review of the theoretical and applied literature, as well as a systematic com-
parison of ten existing or proposed trading schemes, allows us to draw two 
kinds of conclusions: an appraisal of European Commission GHG trading di-
rective proposal, and some reflections on the discrepancy between economic 
theory and international experience. 
The European directive proposal has many good provisions. First it provides a 
wide spatial and sectoral coverage. Note that the latter could have been nar-
rowed a lot by the opt-out provision – present in previous drafts of the pro-
posal – which allowed a state to exclude some sectors from the system pro-
vided that they were regulated by another instrument, such as a voluntary 
agreement. Such a provision, which is still pushed for by some industries and 
Member States, may harm a lot the efficiency of the system. Second, concern-
ing temporal flexibility, the directive proposal allows banking but not borrow-
ing. Both provisions seem sound, the former because there is no risk of "tem-
poral hot spot" in the context of climate change, the latter because the result-
ing loss of cost-effectiveness is a reasonable price to pay for easing enforce-
ment. Third, for the trading organisation, the proposal soundly sticks to usual 
practices by allowing bilateral transactions without government approval but 
with mandatory registration. 
However other provisions raise some concerns. First, high quality monitoring 
is deemed essential by the Commission, which motivates its decision to start 
with the sole CO2. However even for this gas calculation using activity data, 
emission factor and oxidation factor is not without problems. The accuracy of 
current national inventories based on this method falls far short of what is 
needed for a trading scheme, so further guidance has to be provided at the EU 
level.  
Second, although compliance penalties seem to be set at a sufficiently high 
level, a difficulty may stem from the international character of EU policy: the 
directive has first to be transposed in Member States legislation and then put 
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 into practice by national administrations, which creates a risk of imperfect 
enforcement by Member States on top of the classical risk of non-compliance 
by polluters. 
Permit allocation is the item which is the most open to criticism. First, the 
directive proposal prevents the Member States from selling the permits in the 
first period (2005-2007) yet available simulation show that covered industries 
are likely to see their profits rise if all permits are grandfathered. Second, 
treatment of new entrants remains unclear in the proposal. If the Commission 
wants to be consistent with the aim of "levelling the playing field", it should 
give more attention to this question. Third, on the contrary to the U.S. NOX 
OTC budget program – the only ongoing trading scheme integrating the fed-
eral and state levels – the European Commission proposal does not set an 
overall cap for each state. As a consequence distortion of competition prob-
lems could arise not only because the allocation criteria vis-à-vis new entrants 
are not precise enough but also because the total amount of allowances to be 
distributed in each Member State will be decided in a highly political process. 
In spite of these shortcomings, the European Commission directive proposal is 
clearly a good system which has more ground in economic literature require-
ments than most other schemes we have reviewed. Unfortunately the text cur-
rently faces major lobbying, especially from Member States whose trading 
system or proposal is incompatible with the directive proposal, and from parts 
of industry that oppose trading or claim for more flexibility. The risk is high 
that the proposal be blocked or further watered down. 
What main stylised facts emerge regarding the discrepancies between theory 
and practice? First, sectoral coverage is generally much narrower than ex-
pected, mainly for political reasons, i.e., preventing too large an opposition 
front to materialize. For example in the U.K., since GHG control already faces 
an opposition from industry, the government has preferred not to include elec-
tricity generation in the trading scheme to prevent an increase in households 
electricity bill. Second, allocation choices clearly reflect political economy 
considerations, i.e., alleviating opposition from regulated industry, over re-
quirements from economic literature. Third, penalties differ very much among 
reviewed schemes and compliance appears to be correlated both to the level 
and to the automatic or case-by-case application of penalties. 
Unsurprisingly, these three items – sectoral coverage, allocation and penalties 
– are the most highly debated in the ongoing negotiation of the European GHG 
trading directive, and the outcome of this process will determine both the envi-
ronmental effectiveness and the economic efficiency of the final text. 
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